

VZCZCXYZ0015
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #4265/01 1110647
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 210647Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4584

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 004265

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/21/2016
TAGS: [PARM](#) [PREL](#) [MNUC](#) [RS](#)
SUBJECT: A/S RADEMAKER'S APRIL 12 MEETING WITH DVBR
DIRECTOR ANTONOV

REF: MOSCOW 3860

Classified By: Minister-Counselor for Political Affairs Kirk Augustine.
Reasons 1.4 (a/b/d/f/h)

11. (C) SUMMARY. In an April 12 meeting with Anatoliy Antonov, Director of the MFA's Department for Disarmament and Security Affairs, ISN Assistant Secretary Stephen Rademaker explained that U.S. concerns about Russian treaty compliance were the main obstacles to U.S. support for Russian membership in the Australia Group. A/S Rademaker also reiterated that the U.S. would like to move forward to negotiate a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty without a verification regime. He informed Antonov that the U.S. is not interested in pursuing an agreement for the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS). Antonov said the GOR would like to extend the mandate of the Security Council Committee established by UNSCR 1540 for two more years, and added that the GOR would like to get consensus for the Committee's activities during the course of these two years. Antonov said the GOR does not agree with the U.S. proposal to restrict anti-vehicle mines within the framework of the Convention on Conventional Weapons. Rademaker requested that the GOR not block consensus on the U.S. proposal, but Antonov rejected that request, noting that Russia would equally like the U.S. to stand aside and not block others negotiating a PAROS agreement in the Conference on Disarmament (CD). Rademaker and Antonov agreed that we need to find ways to attract more countries to participate in the Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation. Rademaker said the U.S. is committed to making pre-launch notifications for missile launches, and suggested that the Joint Defense Exchange Center (JDEC) would be the best way to do that. Antonov said that we could move forward again on the JDEC. Antonov reported that the joint U.S.-Russian proposal to launch the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism is still within the Russian interagency clearance process. Discussion on Iran was covered reftel. END SUMMARY.

AUSTRALIA GROUP

12. (C) Antonov raised U.S. opposition to Russian membership in the Australia Group (AG). He said the U.S. list of conditions that Russia must first meet before being able to join the AG failed to reflect the many changes that had taken place in the U.S.-Russia strategic relationship over the past decade and our cooperation in the BW and CW framework and on export controls. The two sides continued, of course, to have differences, "but that's normal." Pointing to the February 22 and March 31 U.S. non-papers detailing those conditions, Antonov said U.S. accusations that Russia may be maintaining an offensive biological weapons program in violation of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) were particularly upsetting. If one were to judge by those non-papers, "We're still enemies." According to Antonov, a number of European states have stated that they could agree to Russia joining the AG, but the U.S. was acting as if the Cold War were still

on. Antonov also protested about stated U.S. concerns over the accuracy of Russia's declaration of chemical weapons stocks under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). He said U.S. concerns over Russia's compliance with the BWC and CWC were unfounded and should not be raised in the context of the Australia Group. Antonov said that if the U.S. really considered Russia to be in violation of the BWC and CWC, the GOR would have to rethink its cooperation with the U.S. in those two spheres.

¶3. (C) Antonov added that U.S. demands for Russian officials to be fired and for non-reciprocal short-notice access to certain sensitive military facilities in Russia as a condition for membership in the Australia Group were insulting. U.S. officials who thought Russia might agree to such demands simply were demonstrating their lack of understanding of Russia. How could they think that sending such papers to the GOR would improve relations between the two countries? The U.S. should not waste its time with this request, as it would not be met. "Russia is a different country in 2006" from what it was a decade ago, "but you talk to us as if we were less important than Iraq or Iran. You're treating us like Russia were Mali or Burundi."

¶4. (C) Antonov asked how Russia and the U.S. could continue to cooperate in the Global Partnership or bilaterally on, e.g., bio-terrorism, if the U.S. really thought Russia was violating the BWC and CWC? How could the U.S. imagine that Russia would accept the U.S. conditions just to join the AG? "We will continue to live without it, and we will survive." Many people in Moscow had wanted Russia to press on U.S. vulnerabilities in the BW area, but Antonov had previously blocked that. Now he had not even reported the latest U.S. non-paper to his superior (Deputy Foreign Minister Kislyak) or to the Russian inter-agency, which would press for Russia

to take up an actively anti-U.S. position, and that would benefit Iran, India, and "some Europeans who dislike U.S.-Russia cooperation." He added that the GOR would be willing to discuss U.S. concerns about Russian CW and biological programs within the framework of general U.S.-Russian cooperation and cited specifically the willingness to discuss the DPRK cases raised in the nonpaper. Antonov then passed a nonpaper to A/S Rademaker responding to the two U.S. papers.

¶5. (C) Rademaker acknowledged that the USG had concerns about Russian CWC and BWC programs, and is required by law to voice those concerns in an annual compliance report to Congress. He added that in 1992 then-President Yeltsin admitted that Soviet officials had lied about the USSR's BW program. Rademaker said the U.S. believed Russia's 1992 BWC declaration to the United Nations was misleading.

¶6. (C) Rademaker said the U.S. also had concerns about a lack of Russian transparency about its CW stockpile. The U.S. side has been asking without success for information about Russia's CW stockpile and possible non-declared CW production facilities. Rademaker added that Russia had back-tracked on an agreement and refused a U.S. request for access to documents on its CW program the GOR had previously shown to the Organization for the Prevention of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). Russian officials had claimed the documents had been "destroyed." Rademaker said the USG did not take the Russian reply seriously, and cited it as an example of Russian non-cooperation regarding CW issues.

¶7. (C) Rademaker explained that since membership in the Australia Group requires a party to be in compliance with the BWC and CWC and the USG continues to have concerns about Russia's compliance with these Conventions, the U.S. could not support Russia's membership until U.S. concerns are addressed. The U.S. remained ready to engage with Russia to resolve the issue.

¶8. (C) Antonov asked Rademaker to cite even one drawback for the U.S. that would result from Russian participation in the AG. Rademaker said the basis for the U.S. position was as

set out in para 7 above, but he added that in a meeting that had just taken place in Washington, Antonov's deputy Mashkov had objected to updating MTCR control lists to take technical developments into account, on the grounds that doing so would be too difficult bureaucratically within the GOR. The same need for updating existed within the AG, and it appeared Russia would not agree to such revisions for the same reasons. Antonov replied that either Mashkov had been misunderstood in Washington or he had not accurately represented the GOR position. Russia was not opposed to revising MTCR control lists -- what it opposed was changing the MTCR Guidelines. Russia also had some reservations about expanding participation in the MTCR, especially with regard to the EU, which thought that the fact that a country (e.g., Slovenia) had joined the EU meant that it automatically qualified to join the MTCR.

19. (C) Antonov returned to the BW area, citing a passage from the U.S. non-paper about a lack of Russian "openness about the Soviet biological weapons program." There was "no framework" for such a U.S. question, he said. "We are a P-5 country. What if I wanted an answer about the U.S. BW program? You still have the capability to have an offensive program. You rejected continuing discussions in the BWC framework about verification -- that may mean that you are continuing an offensive BW program." He added, "We are ready to cooperate, but you have to decide whether we are partners, or whether you're a superpower and we're from Africa." The GOR was compiling a list of all CW and BW programs where the two sides were cooperating, and "we may need to stop them if there is no trust. We are not students, and you are not professors. We are equals."

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

110. (C) A/S Rademaker said the Conference on Disarmament (CD) is going into its ninth year with no real work accomplished. The U.S. would like to reinvigorate the CD and was considering submitting a draft Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT). There would not be any surprises in the draft text. Since the U.S. believed, it would be difficult to negotiate a verification regime and verification in any case could not be very effective, such a draft would not propose any verification provisions, but would instead leave it up to individual states to use their own national means and methods to assess compliance. The U.S. remained opposed to the Shannon Mandate because of its presumption that an FMCT Treaty must include a verification regime. Antonov said the Shannon Mandate was so vague on verification that even the U.S. should be able to accept it. Rademaker repeated that

the Shannon Mandate clearly foresaw a verification regime.

111. (C) Rademaker said if the U.S. put forward a draft Treaty text, a main obstacle would be political linkages to other CD proposals that countries have attached to the FMCT. The USG believes FMCT negotiations should be able to begin even if there is no movement on related CD issues. He asked whether the GOR would be willing to de-link the FMCT from agreement on discussions concerning the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS). The FMCT, which enjoys consensus in principle within the CD, was being held hostage to PAROS, which does not enjoy consensus. Antonov said Russia was willing to start negotiations on an FMCT and would not block consensus, but it would not actively support the U.S. in forming such a consensus. He indeed doubted that a consensus for FMCT negotiations could be achieved without at least discussions on PAROS. If the U.S. tabled an FMCT draft, there would be no real discussion of it, because there would be no decision to form an ad hoc discussion group. He noted that when Russia took over the CD chair, it would have to take NAM views more strongly into account.

112. (C) Antonov said that Russian Ambassador Loshchinin had said Russia would need U.S. help during its presidency on PAROS and on radiological weapons. He planned to organize a discussion on PAROS and hoped the U.S. would send experts to

discuss that issue. In any event, Antonov said he wanted a U.S.-Russia bilateral dialogue on outer space to continue. Rademaker said he would be surprised if the U.S. sent experts to Geneva to discuss PAROS, but he said bilateral discussions of outer space could continue.

¶13. (C) Antonov asked whether the U.S. was still opposed to discussions on PAROS, adding that it was a top priority for Russia within the CD. He added that the GOR would be willing to be flexible to reach some sort of agreement on PAROS. Rademaker replied that the CD works on consensus, and the U.S. is not interested in PAROS. He added that he would think that Russia would share with the U.S. an interest in China being limited by an FMCT. Antonov said he regarded PAROS as a higher priority than FMCT.

UNSCR 1540

¶14. (C) Antonov said the GOR would like to extend the mandate of the Security Council Committee established by UNSCR 1540 for two more years. He added that the GOR would like to get consensus on a relatively simple text for the Committee's activities during the course of these two years. He said that Russia would introduce a draft text to do that, but was also willing to work on the basis of the UK draft.

¶15. (C) A/S Rademaker said the U.S. also wanted to extend the Committee's mandate and would like to include specific language that deals with proliferation-related financing. Antonov said that 1540 had required a "delicate compromise" that should not be overturned. The GOR did not feel it appropriate to single out proliferation financing as an issue that merited more attention than other issues (e.g., export controls, prevention) in the framework of 1540. Russia was ready for a compromise, and urged the U.S. to find a formulation that drew only on existing 1540 language. He noted that Russia would also like to draw on 1540 language to include in G-8 documents at the St. Petersburg summit, and would look for a U.S. proposal.

CONVENTION ON CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS

¶16. (C) Antonov began the discussion by passing over a nonpaper replying to the U.S. proposal to restrict anti-vehicle mines within the framework of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW). He said the majority of non-aligned countries do not support the U.S. proposal for a Mines Other Than Anti-Personnel Mines (MOPATOM) Protocol, and added that such mines have legitimate uses. He said China and Pakistan would not negotiate the issue. If the U.S. would like to start a process of negotiating agreement on MOPATOM outside the framework of the CCW, Russia would not object.

¶17. (C) A/S Rademaker requested that the GOR not block consensus of the U.S. proposal within the CCW Group of Experts. He added that the U.S. and Russia have a lot in common regarding their stand on anti-vehicle mines. Antonov noted that the Russia would not stand aside and let others pursue the issue within the CD, just as the U.S. would not stand aside and let PAROS negotiations proceed. Moreover, there was no statistical data confirming that anti-vehicle mines are a humanitarian problem. Russia had also been seeking clarity on what kind of an instrument the U.S. wanted, and how it would affect the Russian army. The U.S.

still had not clarified those issues. Rademaker said he would take the Russian non-paper to Washington for it to be studied.

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY

¶18. (C) Rademaker raised the issue of making it a binding principle in the IAEA that a country under investigation for possible violations of its obligations should not be in a

position to act in the Board of Governors or the new Special Committee on Safeguards and Verification when its own case was being considered. Antonov turned to his deputy Oleg Rozhkov for a response. Rozhkov said that the issue could not be resolved without changes to the IAEA Statute and to its Rules of Procedure. Such changes would require ratification and would take decades, and in any case the NAM did not support making such changes. Rademaker suggested that the principle in question, which had been accepted by the G-8 at Sea Island, could be reiterated in St. Petersburg. Antonov said he was not sure, but would be willing to look at an American proposal.

HAGUE CODE OF CONDUCT

¶19. (C) Antonov raised the issue of the Hague Code of Conduct (HCOC), wondering whether Russia should continue to submit annual declarations when the U.S. was failing to do so. Rademaker responded that the U.S. was committed to making pre-launch notifications for vehicle launches and test flights. We had expected, however, to be able to make the same notifications to HCOC as we made to the bilateral Joint Defense Exchange Center (JDEC), but agreement on the JDEC had become stalled over the liability issue. Now that liability was close to resolution, it should be possible to move forward with the JDEC and that would resolve our problem with the HCOC. Antonov said he did not understand the U.S. position. The U.S. had accepted a multilateral obligation to provide HCOC notifications, and it was not meeting that obligation. The bilateral JDEC issue was a separate issue. Did the U.S. think Russia should also not be making HCOC notifications? The Russian military was very reluctant to make such notifications when the U.S. was refusing to do so. If Russia stopped, Antonov said, the majority of other HCOC countries would also not comply with HCOC obligations.

¶20. (C) Rademaker and Antonov agreed that ways should be found to attract more countries to participate in the HCOC. Rademaker said the U.S. appreciated Russia's intentions in proposing amendments designed to make the HCOC more attractive to other countries, but the majority of countries were not yet prepared to support changes to the HCOC. Antonov said the GOR's main concern was to bring China and India into the regime.

GLOBAL INITIATIVE

¶21. (C) Antonov reported that the joint U.S.-Russian proposal to launch the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism was still in the Russian interagency clearing process.

¶22. (U) A/S Rademaker has cleared this cable.
BURNS